Texas Governor-elect Gina Hinojosa has said she will freeze residential electricity rates on her first day in office until the state legislature enacts laws requiring data centers and other large power users to pay their own way. The concern is understandable: Households shouldn’t have to subsidize infrastructure for large corporate customers. But assigning costs fairly and freezing prices are two different policies. The first helps protect consumers from costs they shouldn’t have to bear. The second will likely create new costs of its own.
Freezing electricity rates may sound attractive, especially as families struggle with rising bills. But doing so doesn’t lower the cost of supplying power. Fuel, equipment, labor, and financing still have to be paid for, and Texas needs continued investment in its electric grid to keep pace with growing demand. A rate freeze that discourages investment in new supply and grid infrastructure could ultimately make Texas electricity more expensive, not less.
We’ve seen versions of this approach before, especially in housing policy. In cities such as New York and San Francisco, rent regulations have helped some tenants stay in their homes while doing little to address the underlying shortage of housing. In some cases, they’ve also discouraged investment and reduced the supply of rental units.
Consider San Francisco. A study in the American Economic Review found that a 1994 expansion of rent control reduced displacement among existing tenants but also prompted affected landlords to reduce rental housing supply by 15 percent through sales to owner-occupants and redevelopment. The protections benefited some renters, but at a cost to others. Berlin offers another example. The city’s Berlin’s 2020 rent freeze similarly lowered advertised rents for regulated apartments, but the number of available rental listings also declined substantially.
Housing and electricity are different markets, but both depend on continued investment to keep pace with demand. And in both cases, policies that force down prices without addressing the underlying costs of providing a good or service ultimately make shortages worse. That’s a particular concern in Texas, where rapidly growing electricity demand requires substantial investment in new generation and grid infrastructure.
Although America has invested in grid upgrades for decades, we are in the middle of a period of unprecedented demand that has accelerated the need to modernize aging equipment and expand supply. ERCOT, which manages most of the state’s electric grid, anticipates substantial growth in power demand over the coming years, driven in part by data centers and industrial expansion. Not all proposed projects will materialize, but meeting even a portion of that demand will require significant investment in new infrastructure.
How Hinojosa’s proposed freeze would work in practice remains an important question. A cap on residential electricity rates would not necessarily limit what generators receive for the power they produce. But if the freeze prevents electricity providers from recovering their costs, someone will have to make up the difference. Suppliers could absorb losses, taxpayers could foot the bill, or customers could face higher charges later.
Before imposing a freeze, state policymakers should explain which charges would be capped, how providers would recover legitimate costs, and what happens when the freeze expires. A temporary, funded subsidy for households is very different from an open-ended cap that leaves electricity providers unable to recover their costs.
Texas’s regulated transmission and distribution networks also require oversight of monopoly power, prudent spending, and reliability. Consumers shouldn’t have to pay for wasteful spending or inefficient operations. But policymakers also should not expect companies to invest in reliable service without a reasonable opportunity to recover their costs.
Building new electricity infrastructure also takes time. According to Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, generation and storage projects completed in 2025 took a median of more than five years to move from an initial request to connect to the grid to commercial operation. That includes development and construction, not just regulatory review. With demand rising, Texas can ill afford policies that make new projects even harder to finance.
Rather than freezing electricity rates, Texas policymakers should focus on several reforms that would help the state meet growing demand while keeping electricity affordable.
First, the state should make it easier to build new energy infrastructure. It should replace duplicative reviews and open-ended administrative processes with coordinated decisions, clear requirements, and firm deadlines. Any proposed policy should preserve safety standards, protect property rights, and provide innovative entrepreneurs with a clear path from proposal to construction.
Second, reward innovation that lowers electricity costs. Let technologies compete to provide dependable supply, lower system costs, and use resources more efficiently. New generation, storage, transmission technologies, and tools to manage electricity demand all deserve consideration. What matters is how well they perform and whether they can deliver power at a competitive cost.
Third, demand financial discipline and projects that can efficiently scale in the free market. Projects need credible customers, realistic timelines, manageable risks, and a reasonable likelihood of earning returns. Promising demonstrations don’t always translate into commercially viable projects. Investors should bear commercial risks, while developers should show that their projects can compete at scale.
Fourth, make growth pay its way. Texas’s 2025 Senate Bill 6 already addresses large-load financial commitments and interconnection costs. The Public Utility Commission has adopted implementing standards requiring qualifying large users to post financial security and fund direct interconnection costs. Texas should build on those protections and ensure that households aren’t left paying for infrastructure built to serve large commercial customers. Targeted assistance that is not susceptible to abuse could provide more immediate relief to households struggling with high bills.
Fifth, release the Energy Kraken. Expand natural gas generation and the infrastructure needed to fuel it, preserve and expand economically viable nuclear capacity, and give geothermal developers opportunities to prove their technologies at scale. New nuclear construction and broad deployment of advanced geothermal require realistic timelines. Neither should be sold as an immediate cure for shortages. Renewables should compete alongside them on cost and reliability but should not be afforded a crutch. In other words, everything competes.
None of these reforms will lower electricity bills overnight—the new wave of policymakers must be honest about that. But expanding supply, encouraging competition, and ensuring that large users pay their share offer a more durable path to affordability than freezing rates. Texas has built a competitive advantage on abundant and affordable energy. Policymakers should focus on preserving it.




